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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2
V
V.

DERALD ROSS,

Case No. 940528-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for receiving or transferring a stolen motor
vehicle, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la1316(2)(1993). This Court has original appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).

[

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether this Court should refuse to review the merits of defendant's appeal
because he has not adequately marshaled the evidence, failing to list the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict and presenting the facts in a one-sided manner?
Because this issue was not before the district court, no standard of review is
appropriate. Nevertheless, State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah 1991) will assist
the Court in detennining whether defendant's brief meets the marshaling rule.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer - Penalty.
It is a second degree felony for a person:

(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the
performance of his duty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural history
After the State rested its case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the
grounds that the evidence did not prove, as a matter of law, that the stolen car did not
belong to defendant (R. 59-64). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that whether
defendant knew or should have known the car was not his was a question for the jury
(R. 291). The jury convicted defendant of a second-degree felony for possessing a
stolen vehicle (R. 129). The trial court sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term
of zero- to fifteen-years at the Utah State Prison (R. 143).

2

Statement offacts
In October 1992, defendant took out a loan for $250 from Quick Loan (R. 214).
As collateral, defendant gave Quick Loan the title to his 1977 Dodge Charger (R. 325).
Defendant admitted that he made no payments on the loan (R. 334). The security
agreement states: "When you [defendant] are in default, lender can take possession of
the collateral without judicial process and advance notice. . . .Lender can exercise all
the rights, privileges and remedies of a secured party under Part 5 of Section 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code" (Security agreement, State's Exhibit Number three,
addendum B).
In November 1992, defendant gave the car to Glen Burns to store at his home in
Stockton, Utah (R. 263). Sometime in April 1992, defendant told Burns that Quick
Loan was looking for the car and asked Burns to say he did not know anything about it
if Quick Loan called (R. 265). Instead, Burns called Quick Loan and the company
came out, inspected the car, and took possession (id.V Three days later, Burns told
defendant that Quick Loan had taken the car (R. 266). Less than a month later, Quick
Loan sold the car to the highest bidder, J&K Automotive, for $75 (R. 226). J&K
Automotive took possession of the car on May 4, 1992 and parked the car outside its
fenced lot on Main Street at approximately 40th South in Salt Lake County (R. 239).
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On approximately May 9, defendant was driving down Main Street and noticed
the Dodge Charger parked at approximately 40th South (R. 304). Defendant parked
the car he was driving and took the Dodge Charger to a trailer park where his father
lived in Sandy, Utah (R. 305). On May 10, 1992, Craig Pavich, an employee for J&K
noticed that the car was missing and reported it to the police (R. 241). In August,
defendant took the car to Ron Ison so he could take out its motor and place it into a
motor home (R. 270-71). While the car was at Mr. Ison's, defendant also came and
took the transmission (R. 271).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's selective presentation of the evidence does not satisfy the essential
requirement to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. He leaves out
evidence that shows defendant was told Quick Loan had repossessed the vehicle almost
a month before defendant took it from its parking place on 40th south and Main Street
in Salt Lake County. This testimony establishes that defendant knew or had reason to
believe that he car had taken the car unlawfully, a vital element of the statute the jury
found defendant violated. Because defendant did not marshal the evidence, the court
should not review the sufficiency argument on the merits.

4

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROPERLY MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT, THIS
COURT SHOULD NOT ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS.
Marshaling is an essential predicate to a successful challenge to a jury verdict.
State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah 1991). It is the first of a two-part analysis in
a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. The defendant must first list all the evidence
that supports the jury's verdict. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah
1993). The defendant must then establish that, even when viewed in its most favorable
light, the marshaled evidence does not support the verdict. McPherson v. Belnap. 830
P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant's brief recites evidence, but the evidence is selective, including only
those portions that cast doubt on the verdict and support the defendant's theory of the
case. This is not marshaling. Scheel. 823 P.2d at 473 (defendant's brief recounts the
facts most favorable to defendant while ignoring lengthy testimony that supports the
verdict). In Scheel. this Court refused to reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency
argument because defendant emphasized only favorable evidence, while leaving to the
appellate court the obligation to ferret out supporting evidence. LL (citing Heinecke v.
Department of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991).
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Here, defendant's brief gives a similarly one-sided presentation of the evidence.
Of vital importance to the verdict is Glen Burns's testimony that defendant told Burns
that Quick Loan was looking for the car and asked for Burns to say nothing about it to
Quick Loan (R. 265). Also, Burns' statement that he told defendant Quick Loan
repossessed the car sometime in April 1993 (R. 265) supports the jury's finding that
defendant knew or had reason to believe that the car was no longer his (R. 266). Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993). Yet, defendant's brief nowhere mentions these
pieces of evidence. Instead, defendant's recitation of facts and argument focuses
exclusively on the false issue of the ten-day notice of sale.1 This issue is irrelevant to
the basic question under the statute whether defendant knew or had reason to believe
that someone else had the "legal right to possession of the vehicle," thus, making
defendant's taking of the car unlawful. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1001 (1993)
(definition of owner of a motor vehicle).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured creditor becomes the legal
successor in interest to the owner when the owner defaults on his security agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503 (1990); Cheyenne Mountain Bank v. Whetstone Corp..
787 P.2d 210, 212 (Colo. App. 1990) (basing decision on Colorado equivalent to
1

Defendant's claim that he maintained his ownership interest in the car because of Quick
Loan's purported failure to give him ten-days notice of the sale is misplaced. The notice of sale does
not affect Quick Loan's possessory interest but may have civil consequences to Quick Loan's ability to
obtain a deficiency judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1990); Wang v. Wang. 440 N.W.2d
740, 742-43 (S.D. 1989). Transfer of possession, and, therefore, ownership, occurs with repossession
of the secured property. Cf Cheyenne Mountain Bank. 787 P.2d at 212.
6

section 70A-9-503). Thus, when Quick Loan repossessed the 1977 Dodge Charger, it
became the owner, i.e., had the legal right of possession (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la1001 (1993)) and defendant was no longer allowed to take the car or dispose of it.
Burns' testimony, therefore, establishes not just this essential ownership question, but
also that defendant knew of the repossession and consequent transfer in ownership
approximately one month before he took the car and began selling its components (R.
305). Additionally, under the UCC, once Quick Loan sold the car to J&K, all
defendant's rights passed to J&K and he had no right to take the car. Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-504(4) (1993) (disposition after default transfers all debtor's rights to
purchaser). Whether defendant received notice within nine days or ten days is
irrelevant to this legal proposition. A technical default in notification of the sale only
gave defendant a potential defense in a later deficiency action; it would not renew his
ownership or possessory interest. £e£ Wang. 440 N.W.2d at 742-43 (failure to give
notification within proper time limits creates a rebuttable presumption that sale
constituted full payment of the debt).
Defendant's brief presents only an abbreviated and biased version of the facts to
this Court, leaving out vital evidence that radically changes the analysis and justifies the
jury verdict. Because of this failure to marshal the evidence, this Court should refuse
to review the merits of defendant's sufficiency claim and affirm the conviction. Scheel.
823 P.2d at 473.
7

CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because the briefs adequately state the facts and legal arguments, oral argument
is not necessary to explain the legal or factual issues. Further, this case does not
involve an area of law that needs development or clarification; therefore, the State does
not request a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS H f d a y of July 1995.
JAN GRAHAM

JTAH ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
<
UTAH
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

Lender: QUICK LOAN SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8.* 115

Loan Number

10287

Borrower: DERALD ROSS

Customer ID

100312

Collateral: 77 DODGE CHARGER SE
Grace Period: 10 Days

Annual
P«rc+ntapg Rata

Finance
Charge

Financed

The cost of
your credit as
a yearly rate

The dollar
amount the
credit will cost
you.

The amount of
credit provided
to you or on
your behalf

Amount

financing Disclosure
njotal of Payments:

45.00

232.50

265.00

The amount you
will have paid
after you have
made ail
payments as
scheduled

-497.50

Orig. Fee: 205.24
Doc. Fee: 10.00
finance Chg: 17.26
Tjotal Finance Chg:

-232.50

497.50
Bees t o Others

Your Payment Schedule Will Be:

Payments of $49.75 each

Notary Fee:
a i l i n g Fee:

5.00
10.00

ENrery 14 days beginning Friday 11/13/92

'dotal Fees t o Others;

Late Fee...

Qheck t o borrower:

$15.00

15.00
250.00

If paid off early you may be entitled to a partial refund of finance charges
PROMISORY NOTE
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of the above lender at the above address or at
such other place as the holder hereof may designate, the Amount Financed above together with prepaid finance charges and interest
from the date hereof at the above Note Rate per annum on unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as set forth in the above
payment schedule.
The undersigned jointly and severally further promise to pay a delinquency charge of the GREATER OF FIVE PERCENT OR FIFTEEN
DOLLARS of any interest or principal payment which has remained unpaid for more that the grace period stated above.
Each payment shall be applied first to any late penalties due, next to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. If
default occurs in the payment of any said installment of principal and/or interest or any part thereof, accrued interest shall be
compounded monthly on the first day of each month and thereafter shall be added to the principal. Said compounded interest and
remaining principal balance shall bear interest at the default rate stated above.
•In the event of an early payoff, the origination fee and the finance charge shall be refunded to the undersigned on a pro-rata basis.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and/or interest or in any part thereof, or in the performance of any
agreement contained in the security agreement or in this Note, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, may declare
the entire principal balance and accured interest due and payable.
W this note is collected by an attorney after default, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs
and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. The undersigned further agree to pay any costs and attorney's fees
incurred by the holder hereof in any bankruptcy-related proceeding including the seeking of relief from the automatic stay. Any such
costs and attorney's fees shall be added to the unpaid Note balance and shall be secured by the security agreement.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment tor payment, demand and notice of dishonor and
nonpayment of this Note, and consent to any and all extension of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted by the
holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this Note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or
without substitution.
Interest will accrue at the default rate on any judgment amount awarded to the payee hereof in connection with any default hereunder.
All returned checks will be subject to a fifteen dollar fee.

SECURITY AGREEMENT
This note is secured by the herein mentioned collateral. You agree to give fender a security interest in this collateral. Any additions or
accessions to the collateral are part of the lender's collateral. While any part of this loan remains unpaid, you agree to use the collateral
carefully and keep it in good repair, obtain written permission from lender before making major alterations, inform lender in writing before
changing your address or the address where the collateral is kept help lender enforce and protect the security interest you have given in
the collateral, not use the collateral for any unlawful purposes, and allow lender or its agent to examine and inspect the collateral at
reasonable times. You further promise to keep the collateral insured and to pay any taxes due on the collateral.
You will be in default if you break any promise you made under this note or security agreement if at any time, any requirements to obtain
this loan are violated, the lender may deem itself insecure and declare default The lender may, at its option, demand immediate payment
of the unpaid balance of the loan if you are in default When you are in default lender can take possession of the collateral without judicial
process and advance notice. If in default you agree to deliver the collateral to lender at a time and place lender chooses. Lender can
exercise all therights,privileges and remedies of a secured party under Part 5 of Section 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Lender will
not be responsible for any of your property not covered by this agreement that you leave inside or attached to the collateral. Lender will try
to return that property to you. After lender has taken possession of the collateral, lender can sell it and apply the proceeds of the sale to the
unpaid balance of the loan. Lender will give you at least ten (10) days' notice of any public sale or the date after which lender will agree to
have a private sale. The costs lender incurs in taking possession of and selling the collateral will be deducted from the money received
from the sale. Lender will apply the rest of the money received to the balance of the loan. If any amounts remain unpaid after the sale, you
will still be liable for the balance. Lender can delay enforcing any of its rights under this agreement any number of times without losing
them. Lender can enforce this agreement against your heirs and legal representatives. If lender changes the terms of the promissory notg^
you agree that this security interest will continue to protect lender.

ADDENDUM

B

70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so
provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available
to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably
convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and
may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 70A-9-504. If a secured party
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or otherwise

(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company

70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default - Effect of
disposition.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the
collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or
processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (Chapter 2). The proceeds of
disposition shall be applied in the order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which the
disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the
collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds
is completed. If requested by the secured party, the holder of a subordinate security interest must
seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need
not comply with his demand.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if
the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any
surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made
by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at
any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the
time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the
secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the
secured party has received (before sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's
renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured
party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may
buy at private sale.
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition transfers to
a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest under
which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of
all such rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements
of this part or of any judicial proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale
and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person conducting
the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, repurchase
agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or is
subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. Such a transfer
of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral under this chapter

(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company

70A-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and
conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or
whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a
right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions
of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any event an
amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the
debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a
different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the
collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current
in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially
reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with respect to sales also
apply as may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved
in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors
shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate
that any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any disposition not
so approved is not commercially reasonable.

(c) 1953-1995 By The Michic Company

ADDENDUM

C

Page 1

787 P.2d 210
11 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 64
(Cite as: 787 P.2d 210)
CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN BANK, PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
WHETSTONE CORPORATION, DefendantAppellee.
No. 88CA1326.
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. III.
Jan. 11, 1990.
After repossessing collateral from buyer upon
default on note, bank brought suit against seller of
collateral, alleging breach of warranty, breach of
contract and misrepresentation. Seller moved for
summary judgment. The District Court, El Paso
County, James Franklin, J., entered summary
judgment in seller's favor, on ground that bank
failed to give notice of breach as required by UCC.
Bank appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marquez, J.,
held that:
(1) bank, as secured party that
repossessed collateral upon buyer's default, was
"legal successor in interest" to buyer and thus met
definition of "buyer" in UCC; (2) bank could seek
recovery as third-party beneficiary of seller's
warranties; (3) indirect notice of warranty claim
received by seller before bank disposed of collateral
was sufficient to raise fact issue as to whether bank's
delay in giving formal notice of claimed defects
until after disposition of collateral was
unreasonable; and (4) trial court prematurely
dismissed misrepresentation claim.
Reversed and remanded.
[1] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <&* 111
349Ak221
Secured creditor, after default by debtor, holds
inchoate possessory interest in disposition of
property. C.R.S. 4-2-103(l)(a), 4-2-103 comment.
[2] SECURED TRANSACTIONS &* 228
349Ak228
Secured creditor, once it repossesses collateral,
becomes "legal successor in interest" to its debtor,
the initial buyer, and therefore also becomes a
"buyer" under UCC for purposes of requirements
for asserting warranty claim. C.R.S. 4-2-103(l)(a).

[3] SALES <$=* 255
343k255
Bank which repossessed collateral as secured
creditor after its debtor, the initial buyer, defaulted,
became buyer's legal successor, and thus "buyer"
within definition of UCC, and was accordingly
entitled to seek recovery as third-party beneficiary
of seller's warranties concerning collateral. C.R.S.
4-2-103(l)(a).
[4] SALES <&* 285(1)
343k285(l)
Requirement that buyer notify seller of breach of
warranty within reasonable time serves three
purposes-it provides seller with opportunity to
correct any defects, to prepare for negotiation and
litigation, and to protect itself against stale claims
asserted after it is too late for seller to investigate
them. C.R.S. 4-2-607(3)(a).
[5] SALES <§=> 445(5)
343k445(5)
Whether notice given by buyer to seller of claimed
breach of warranty is satisfactory and whether it is
given within reasonable time are generally questions
of fact to be measured by all circumstances of case.
C.R.S. 4-2-607(3)(a).
[6] SALES <§=> 285(3)
343k285(3)
Bank's failure to give direct notice to seller of
claimed breach of warranties concerning repossessed
collateral did not render bank's post-disposition
notice unreasonable as matter of law, where prior to
bank's sale of collateral, potential purchaser had
notified seller of claimed defects in collateral;
indirect notice served all purposes of notification
requirement and raised fact issue as to
reasonableness, since seller had opportunity to
correct defects before bank's resale, opportunity to
investigate claimed defects, opportunity to prepare
for negotiations with bank and to protect itself
against stale claim. C.R.S. 4-2-607(3)(a).
[7] SALES € » 285(1)
343k285(l)
In instances in which seller may have indirect notice
of claim of breach of warranty before buyer disposes
of property, it cannot be said, as matter of law, that
not formerly notifying seller of defects until after
disposition is necessarily "unreasonable." C.R.S. 4-
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2-607(3)(a).
[8] JUDGMENT <§=> 186
228kl86
Trial court erred in dismissing misrepresentation
claim, which admittedly failed to state cause of
action, without allowing plaintiff to depose
defendant's president prior to hearing on summary
judgment motion, where plaintiff had had notice of
deposition at least one month prior to hearing;
conceivably, after deposition, misrepresentation
claim could have been amended to state claim upon
which relief could be granted.
*211 Joseph M. Ricci, P.C., Joseph M. Ricci and
Terrence T. McGannon, Colorado Springs, for
plaintiff-appellant.
Holme Roberts & Owen, James T. Flynn and
Walter H. Sargent, Colorado Springs, for defendantappellee.
Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ.
Cheyenne Mountain Bank (Bank) appeals from the
summary judgment dismissing its claims for
breaches of warranties, breach of contract, and
misrepresentation against Whetstone Corporation.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The Bank received a security interest from
Hawaiian Macadamia of Maui, Ltd., in a candymaking machine manufactured and sold by
Whetstone to Hawaiian. When Hawaiian defaulted,
the Bank repossessed the machine and eventually
sold it to Wes Niswonger for substantially less than
the amount due on the note. Hawaiian having filed
bankruptcy, the Bank was left with only Whetstone
to recoup the deficiency.
After selling the machine to Niswonger, the Bank
wrote to Whetstone describing the problems with the
machine and claiming that there were breaches of
warranties. The Bank later brought this action
against Whetstone, alleging that the various defects
in the machine constituted breaches of warranties,
breach of contract, and misrepresentations. The
Bank further asserted that it had standing to pursue
these claims as a third-party beneficiary of
Whetstone's warranties under § 4-2-318, C.R.S.
In response to Whetstone's motion for summary

judgment, the Bank submitted an affidavit from
Niswonger. In that affidavit, Niswonger described
the problems with the machine which he claims to
have discussed with Whetstone prior to purchasing
the machine from the Bank.
Before the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, the trial court issued a protective order
staying the Bank's deposition of Whetstone's
president until the motion *212 for summary
judgment was decided. At the summary judgment
hearing, the Bank made an offer of proof that
Niswonger had acted as its agent in contacting
Whetstone about defects in the machine and argued
that this satisfied any required notice to Whetstone.
The trial court dismissed all claims, and this appeal
followed.
I.
The Bank contends the trial court erred in ruling,
as a matter of law, that the Bank failed to give
notice of breach as required by § 4-2-607(3)(a),
C.R.S. We agree.
In granting summary judgment, the court relied on
White v. Mississippi Order Buyers, Inc., 648 P.2d
682 (Colo.App. 1982), ruling that the time which
had elapsed before the Bank gave Whetstone notice
of the warranty claim was unreasonable. We
conclude that such a determination on a summary
judgment motion was error. However, before
addressing the timeliness of the notice, we consider
whether the Bank was even required to give notice
to Whetstone of the alleged breaches.
Section 4-2-607(3)(a), C.R.S., requires a "buyer"
to notify the seller within a reasonable time of any
breach of warranty. Failure to so notify the seller
precludes a remedy to the "buyer." Section 4-2607(3)(a), C.R.S.; Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.,
684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
A "buyer" means a person who buys or contracts
to buy goods.
Section 4-2-103(l)(a), C.R.S.
Certainly, at the time a security agreement is
executed, a secured party neither buys nor contracts
to buy goods, but rather holds only a lien on that
property. However, in every ordinary case, the
definition of "buyer" also includes "any legal
successor in interest" to the buyer. Section 4-2-103,
C.R.S. (Official Comment 1).
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[1] Generally, a "successor in interest" is one who
follows another in ownership or control of property.
Black's Law Dictionary 1283 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
A secured creditor, after default by the debtor, holds
an inchoate possessory interest in the disposition of
the property. See People ex rel. VanMeveren v.
District Court, 619 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1980). The
Bank followed Hawaiian in control over the
equipment after it repossessed the machine and in
fact acknowledges that it succeeded to all interests
and rights to the equipment and that it was the
"assignee of the warranties of the buyer."
[2] We reject the bank's contention that a thirdparty beneficiary, by its inherent definition, cannot
also be a "buyer." See Western Equipment Co.,
Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806
(Wyo.1980) (definition of "buyer" includes "any
person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume, or be affected by goods," and a remote
"buyer" may sue manufacturer for economic loss
caused by breach of warranty).
Accordingly, we hold that a secured creditor, once
it repossesses the collateral, becomes a "legal
successor in interest" to its debtor, the initial buyer,
and therefore also becomes a "buyer" within the
meaning of § 4-2-103(l)(a). But see Johnson v.
General Motors Corp., 349 Pa.Super. 147, 502
A.2d 1317 (1986) (holding that the heir of a buyer
is not a legal successor in interest to the buyer and
therefore cannot qualify as a "buyer" under the
U.C.C.).
[3] In addition, since the Bank is a "buyer," the
trial court properly ruled, on the undisputed facts,
that the Bank could seek recovery as a third-party
beneficiary of Whetstone's warranties. See Western
Equipment Co., Inc., supra.
Accordingly, § 4-2-607(3)(a), C.R.S., required
the Bank to notify Whetstone within a reasonable
time of the breach of warranty. However, the trial
court here erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that
the time that elapsed before the bank gave notice
was unreasonable under White, supra.
The procedural context of this case is materially
different from White. There, after a bench trial, the
court determined as a factual matter that notice was
not given within a reasonable time. We affirmed
that factual finding since the buyer did not notify his
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seller of the breach before he resold the goods.
•213 By contrast, here, the trial court granted
Whetstone's motion for summary judgment when
the factual resolution of whether notification was
made within a reasonable time was still in dispute.
[4] The notice requirement of § 4-2-607(3)(a),
C.R.S. serves three purposes: it provides the seller
with an opportunity to correct any defect, to prepare
for negotiation and litigation, and to protect itself
against stale claims asserted after it is too late for the
seller to investigate them. Prutch v. Ford Motor
Co., 618 P.2d 657 (Colo.1980). And, the buyer's
disposition of the subject property before notifying
the seller of the breach frustrates these purposes.
White, supra.
[5] Whether the notice given is satisfactory and
whether it is given within a reasonable time are
generally questions of fact to be measured by all the
circumstances of the case. White, supra; Western
Conference Resorts, Inc. v. Pease, 668 P.2d 973
(Colo.App. 1983). But see Myers v. Koop, 757
P.2d 162 (Colo.App. 1988).
[6] Here, Niswonger's affidavit notes that prior to
his purchase, he contacted and informed Whetstone
of certain problems with the machine. The affidavit
further states that on several occasions prior to the
Bank's sale of the machine to Niswonger, Whetstone
actually attempted to fix the problems. The trier of
fact could consider these statements, along with the
Bank's post-disposition notice, and conclude that
Whetstone, regardless of whether Niswonger was
the bank's agent, had actual notice and that such
notice was given within a reasonable time.
If the affidavit's assertions are accepted as true,
then all of the purposes of the notification
requirement would be satisfied. That is, Whetstone
had the opportunity to correct the defects before the
Bank's resale, and in fact attempted to do just that.
Further, Whetstone was given the opportunity to
investigate the claimed defects before the Bank's
disposition. Finally, Whetstone's knowledge of the
problems afforded it the chance to prepare for
negotiations with the Bank. When the purposes of
the notice requirement have been fully served by
actual notice, the notice provision should not
operate as a technical procedural barrier to deny
claimants the opportunity to litigate the case on the
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merits. Prutch, supra.
[7] In the circumstances at issue in which the
seller may have indirect notice of a claim before the
buyer disposes of the property, we cannot say, as a
matter of law, that formally notifying the seller of
defects after that disposition is necessarily
"unreasonable." The trier of fact will have to make
such a determination. See White, supra.
II.
[8] The Bank also challenges the dismissal of its
misrepresentation claim. We agree that dismissal
was improper.
The Bank's amended complaint fails to allege that
Whetstone made any representations with knowledge
of, or an utter disregard as to, their falsity.
However, the trial court did not allow the Bank to
depose Whetstone prior to the hearing on summary
judgment even though notice of deposition was
provided at least one month prior to that hearing,
and the expense to Whetstone would have been
minimal. Conceivably, after such deposition, the
misrepresentation claim could have been amended to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings.
STERNBERG and CRISWELL, JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Robert L. WANG, Plaintiff and Appellee,
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reasonably have been obtained through sale
conducted according to law. SDCL 57A-9-101 et
seq.,57A-9-507(l).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Submitted on Briefs Nov. 30, 1988.
Decided May 3, 1989.
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1989.
Assignee appealed from judgment on jury verdict
for cosigner of note in assignee's suit to recover
deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court, 393
N.W.2d 771, reversed and remanded. On remand,
the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Tripp County,
James W. Anderson, J., entered judgment on jury
verdict in favor of assignee. Cosigner appealed.
The Supreme Court, Morgan, J., held that: (1)
under "Arkansas rule," assignee's failure to give
cosigner requisite notice of dispositional sale of
collateral did not preclude recovery of deficiency
judgment; (2) jury verdict would not be overturned
on ground that sale of collateral was not
commercially reasonable;
and (3) assignee
constructively elected remedy of strict foreclosure
and was thereby barred from recovering deficiency
judgment.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
[1] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <S=> 240
349Ak240
Guarantors, accommodation parties, and other
obligors who owe collateral duty to pay deficiencies
are "debtors" within meaning of Article 9 of
Uniform Commercial Code. SDCL 57A-9-101 et
seq.; U.CC. § 9-105(l)(d).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
[2] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <S^ 240
349Ak240
South Dakota follows "Arkansas rule" indulging
rebuttable presumption that collateral was worth at
least the amount of debt, thereby shifting to creditor
the burden of proving the amount that would

[3] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <&=* 240
349Ak240
Assignee's failure to give cosigner of note the
requisite notice of disposition of collateral did not
bar deficiency judgment. SDCL 57A-9-504(3),
57A-9-507(l).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
[4] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <§=> 240
349Ak240
Failure to sell collateral in commercially reasonable
manner does not necessarily preclude creditor from
recovering deficiency. SDCL 57A-9-504(3), 57A9-507(1).
[5] SECURED TRANSACTIONS G=> 240
349Ak240
General verdict in favor of assignee bringing suit
against cosigner of note to recover deficiency
judgment would not be overturned on ground that
sale of collateral was commercially unreasonable;
jury was instructed on language of applicable UCC
provision and judicial checklist identifying
distinguishing characteristics of acceptable auction
sale, as well as its duty to find that cosigner's
obligation to pay amount of note was discharged to
extent sale proceeds were inadequate if it found that
sale was not commercially reasonable and could
have reached verdict under those instructions and
allowed for inadequacies of sale procedure. SDCL
57A-9-504(3).
[6] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <&* 240
349Ak240
Assignee of note had, by his actions, constructively
elected remedy of strict foreclosure and was thereby
barred from recovering deficiency judgment;
assignee took and maintained exclusive control and
possession of collateral from time he purchased
note, continuously held collateral on his property
and told other signer not to remove it and stay away,
did not file suit to collect on note until over one year
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later, and did not undertake sale of collateral until
four and one-half years after taking possession.
SDCL57A-9-505(2).
*741 Bryce A. Flint of Jackley & Flint, Sturgis,
for plaintiff and appellee.
Donald E. Covey of Covey Law Office, Winner,
for defendant and appellant Schramm.
MORGAN, Justice.
Albert Schramm (Schramm), who co-signed a
promissory note with Victor Wang (Victor) in favor
of the Rosebud Credit Union, appeals from a
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of
Robert Wang (Robert), assignee of the note, in
Robert's suit to recover a deficiency judgment. We
reverse and remand.
This appeal comes before this court after reversal
of an earlier decision in Schramm's favor and the
retrial thereof. The initial decision and background
information may be found at Wang v. Wang, 393
N.W.2d 771 (S.D.1986) (Wang I). The substance
of the decision was that Schramm was not a signer
in a representative capacity and thus could be held
liable to the assignee.
In July 1980, when Robert received the
promissory note and security agreement by
assignment from the Rosebud Credit Union, he
promptly notified Victor and took exclusive
possession of the collateral that secured the note,
which was stored on his property in Meade County.
He told Victor that he was to stay away from the
collateral. Robert maintained control over the
collateral by keeping it on his private property,
draining radiators, and protecting it from vandals.
In September 1981, while retaining exclusive
possession of the collateral, Robert commenced the
lawsuit on the note, which culminated in Wang I.
In December 1984, after the first trial and while the
appeal therefrom was in process, Robert undertook
the sale of the collateral. A notice of sale was
published in the Mellette County News, White
River, South Dakota, the county where the vehicles
were titled but not where the collateral was located.
No other notices were published. No sale bills were
prepared or distributed. No notice was sent to
Schramm. The notice of sale stated that the
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property would be sold on January 18, 1985, "at
1915 Junction, Sturgis, South Dakota. The sale
shall be held in Sturgis as the property is not in
working condition and also too bulky to be
transported/ The address given was Robert's
residence and the notice did not state whether the
property was available for inspection.
The sale was conducted at Robert's kitchen table
on the day and time set. Only Robert and his
attorney were present. The collateral was not
present at the place where the sale was to be
conducted and was in fact located approximately
five miles away. Robert, who conducted the sale,
bid $100 for the property.
After the foreclosure sale, Robert brought suit to
recover a deficiency judgment, the genesis of this
appeal. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Robert in the amount of $42,900.00. On appeal,
Schramm raises several claims of alleged error.
Among others, he contends that the trial court erred
by denying his motions for directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) on the
grounds that:
•742 (1) Robert had failed to give Schramm notice
of the dispositional sale of the collateral;
(2) The sale of the collateral was not a
commercially reasonable sale; and
(3) Robert had elected a remedy of strict
foreclosure thereby barring a deficiency judgment.
We agree with Schramm that Robert is barred from
recovering a deficiency judgment under issue three.
We first determine that, as to the issues under
review, there is no dispute as to the facts. Thus, the
appeal hinges entirely on the application of the law
to those facts. The applicable law is found entirely
within the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and
more particularly in SDCL ch. 57A-9, Secured
Transactions.
To simplify matters, further
references to the Code will be made by referring to
its corresponding U.C.C. citation, 9-504(3) for
example.
We first choose to review the issue of failure to
give Schramm notice of the public sale. There is no
question that Robert did not send any notice of sale
to Schramm. It is Robert's position that he was not
required to do so because, while both Victor and
Schramm were debtors on the note, only Victor was
a debtor with regard to the collateral. In support of
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this position, he cites us to 9-105(l)(d) which
provides, in pertinent part: "Where the debtor and
the owner of the collateral are not the same person,
the term 'debtor' means the owner of the collateral
in any provision of the chapter dealing with the
collateral^]" He cites us to no case authority after
the enactment of the U.C.C., in support of his
position.

failure to comply with the U.C.C. notice
requirements is found at 9-507(1) wherein it states,
in pertinent part: "If the disposition has occurred
the debtor ... has a right to recover from the secured
party any loss caused by the failure to comply with
the provisions of this part." There are three
divergent views on the effect of this provision on
deficiencies.

[1] 9-504(3) requires that, absent certain
conditions not relevant here, "reasonable
notification of the time and place of any public sale
... shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor if
he has not signed after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his right to notification of
sale." A debtor is defined at 9-105(l)(d) as:
'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or
other performance of the obligation secured,
whether or not he owns or has rights in the
collateral, and includes the seller or accounts or
chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of
the collateral are not the same person, the term
'debtor' means the owner of the collateral in any
provision of the chapter dealing with the
collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing
with the obligation, and may include both where
the context so requires[.]

One view is that since it does not mention
deficiencies, they are not precluded. Some courts
have held that 9-507(1) prescribes the sole penalty
for the creditor's failure to give notice and does not
shield the debtor from a deficiency judgment. *743
See Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75
Misc.2d 181, 347 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. City
Ct.1973); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast,
11 Wash.App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 (1974).

The majority of jurisdictions interpreting this
provision
have
held
that
"guarantors,
accommodation parties, and other obligors who owe
a collateral duty to pay deficiencies are debtors
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Code." Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F.Supp. 996,
1002 (E.D.Pa. 1982).

The other extreme, the anti-deficiency view,
decries recovery of a deficiency where the notice
requirement was not met for the reason that it would
permit a continuation of the evil which the U.C.C.
sought to correct. This view stresses the loss of the
owner's right of redemption through his loss of the
opportunity to bid at the sale. Skeels v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696
(W.D.Pa.1963) (vacated on other grounds, 335
F.2d 846 (3rd Cir.1964)). Another line of antideficiency cases holds that strict compliance with the
notice requirement is a condition precedent to a
claim for a deficiency. Bank of Gering v. Glover,
192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974).

We agree with the majority view. In Wang I,
supra, we determined that Schramm was personally
liable to Robert as a comaker of the note but made
no determination as to his accommodation character.
In view of the fact that Robert earnestly seeks to
hold Schramm liable for any deficiency, we deem
the exact nature of his liability to be unimportant,
for he would nevertheless be included among the
class of "other obligors who owe a collateral duty to
pay deficiencies."

Lastly, there is an intermediate view, termed the
Arkansas Rule, holding that 9-507(1) is not an
exclusive remedy, but that SDCL 57A-1-103
incorporates prior principles of law and equity
which remain effective.
This rule indulges a
rebuttable presumption that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to
the creditor the burden of proving the amount that
would reasonably have been obtained through a sale
conducted according to law. Norton v. National
Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143,
398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).

[2] [3] We then consider what is the effect of
Robert's failure to give Schramm the requisite
notice. Schramm urges that it amounts to a bar
against any deficiency, but this is an issue that this
court has yet to decide. The provision governing

Our decision in First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v.
Kehn Ranch, 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D.1986),
discussed the effect of failure to give notice of the
sale of the collateral cattle at sale barns. [FN1]
First, the majority noted that Kehns had waived
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their right to receive prior notice of sale of
collateral, because notice became an issue at trial
and the jury found by special interrogatory that bank
had failed to give reasonable notice. Next, the
majority responded that 9-504(3) authorizes sale
without notice of collateral of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market, and that auction sale
barns are a recognized market, thereby eliminating
the requirement for notice. Obviously, Kehn Ranch
is not authority for this case inasmuch as the
collateral was not cattle, nor was it sold on a public
market that would be recognized, even under the
Kehn Ranch definition. It is, however, illustrative
of a situation where the deficiency was not and
could not have been created by the manner of sale.
As noted in the dissent, "it is strikingly obvious that
the large deficiency was created by the
disappearance of approximately two-thirds of the
collateral prior to Bank's repossession and not due
to the sale of the remaining collateral." 394
N.W.2d at 724. Similarly, in this case, undisputed
testimony in the record would place the 1980 value
of the collateral at the time it was seized by Robert
in the amount of at least $30,100.
FN1. For a discussion on the distinction between
notice and commercially reasonable sale, see
Richard Barnes, Field Warehousing Cattle and
Their Sale on Recognized Markets, 9 J.Agric.Tax'n
& L. 337-352 (1988).
It is obvious that Robert improperly sought to
gain for himself a huge windfall by his method of
handling this sale. For that reason, it would be easy
to say that the harshest of remedies should be
applied against him and adopt the anti-deficiency
view expressed above. Or we could adopt the other
extreme and hold Robert, or any other creditor, free
of the requirement that reasonable notice be given
where appropriate under the code requirements.
However, it is said that bad facts often create bad
law and we prefer to step back and take a wider
view of the result of our decision. In doing so, we
choose to adopt the so-called Arkansas Rule and
raise a rebuttable presumption that the value is equal
to the amount of the debt.
In this case, as previously noted, the undisputed
testimony of Victor, the owner of the collateral,
placed the value of the property at the time it was
seized. Granted that there was a considerable period
that elapsed between the seizure and the sale. Under
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the facts in this case, any further depreciation should
not redond to the benefit of Robert and to the loss of
Schramm or Victor. Even so, it appears *744 that
there does exist a deficiency between the amount of
principal and interest sought on the note and the
value of the collateral seized.
Schramm next urges that Robert is denied a
deficiency judgment because the sale of the
collateral was not "commercially reasonable." 9504(3) requires: "Disposition of the collateral may
be by public or private proceedings and may be
made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and
at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially
reasonable." We discussed the criteria for a
commercially reasonable sale in First Bank v.
Haberer Dairy & Farm Equipment, 412 N.W.2d
866 (S.D.1987), wherein we adopted the following
checklist identifying distinguishing characteristics of
an acceptable auction sale:
1. A sale at which the public, particularly
including the knowledgeable trade public, is
invited, by prior advertisement, to appear and bid
for the collateral to be sold.
2. If the collateral is goods, they should be
available for inspection by prospective bidders
before the sale.
3. The advertisement should be published in at
least one newspaper of general circulation, and
perhaps appropriate trade publications, reasonably
in advance of the time of sale to allow potential
bidders to participate, and should provide a
reasonable amount of information concerning the
time and place of sale and the collateral to be sold.
4. The goods must be offered and sold for cash to
the highest responsible bidder; and bidders must
know of other bids and be permitted to raise their
bids.
5. The place of sale, moreover, must be accessible
to the general public; and the sale itself, if not
conducted by one of the parties or a public
official, must generally be under the direction of a
licensed auctioneer.
Id. at 871-2 (citing W. Davenport & D. Murray,
Secured Transactions, § 6.05(b)(2), at 273-74). In
Haberer Dairy we determined that the sales
proceedings were commercially reasonable, so we
did not discuss the remedy that would be available
were they not so.

Copr. * West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works

Page

440N.W.2d740
(Cite as: 440 N.W.2d 740, *744)
Just as in the preceding issue on notice, the
U.C.C. provision for remedy for failure to sell in a
commercially reasonable manner is likewise found
in 9-507(1), which provides in pertinent part:
If it is established that the secured party is not
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of
this part disposition may be ordered or restrained
on appropriate terms and conditions. If the
disposition has occurred the debtor or any person
entitled to notification or whose security interest
has been made known to the secured party prior to
the disposition has a right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by a failure to
comply with the provisions of this part.
And, just as in the case of failure to give notice,
courts seem to follow the middle of the road
reasoning of the Arkansas Rule.
[4] The failure to sell collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner does not necessarily preclude the
creditor from recovering a deficiency.
'[Noncompliance with the statute gives rise to a
presumption in favor of the debtor that the
collateral was worth the amount of the outstanding
debt at the time of the default and the debtor is
freed from any deficiency unless the creditor
proves that the fair market value of the collateral
was no greater than the sales pricef.] ... [W]hen
the creditor seeks a deficiency but has failed to
sell the goods in a commercially reasonable
manner, the debtor is entitled to be credited with
the fair market value of the collateral rather than
the actual sales price.'
Ferrous Financial Services Co. v. Wagnon, 70
Or.App. 285, 291, 689 P.2d 974, 978 (1984) (citing
All-State Leasing v. Ochs, 42 Or.App. 319, 600
P.2d 899 (1979)).
In this case, the jury was instructed in the
language of 9-504(3) and the Haberer Dairy
checklist. They were further instructed that if they
found that the sale *745 was not commercially
reasonable, then they must find "that the obligation
of Albert Schramm to pay the amount of the
promissory note is discharged to the extent the sale
proceeds were inadequate." Neither party raises any
issue on appeal with regard to the propriety of the
instructions. We do not find them objectionable
under the theory of recovery espoused by the
Oregon courts, which we deem to be appropriate for
application in this state.
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[5] In both this issue and the preceding one, we
find it difficult to review the propriety of the verdict
because only a general verdict form was submitted
to the jury. There were no interrogatories submitted
with respect to Schramm's defenses of lack of
notice, commercially unreasonable sale, and strict
foreclosure. With respect to the first two, as we
have discussed them, we are left with a dilemma.
We must assume that the jury followed the court's
instructions. Therefore, they either found that the
statutory requirements were complied with or they
applied the court's instruction and set off any loss to
Schramm that they found to be due because of the
violations, thereby reducing the claim for $80,000
plus to the figure of $42,900.
It is admitted that no notice of sale was given to
Schramm. The sale procedures followed by Robert
were pathetically short of complying with the
Haberer Dairy checklist. Further, the bid was so far
below the value of the property, that we can say as a
matter of law that those provisions were violated.
However, that does not mean that the jury verdict
cannot stand. We have said that, "in a civil case, if
a general verdict is handed down and the jury could
have decided the case on two theories, one proper
and one improper, the reviewing court will assume
that it was decided on the proper theory." MidAmerica Marketing Corp. v. Dakota, Etc., 289
N.W.2d 797, 799 (S.D.1980). Because the jury
could have reached the verdict under the instruction
and allowed for the inadequacies of the sale
procedures, we must uphold it.
[6] Lastly, we examine Schramm's argument that
Robert, by his actions, had constructively elected
the remedy of strict foreclosure and is thereby
barred from recovering a deficiency judgment. 9505(2) provides for strict foreclosure, in pertinent
part:
[A] secured party in possession may, after default,
propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of
the obligation. Written notice of such proposal
shall be sent to the debtorf.] ... In the absence of
... written objection the secured party may retain
the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's
obligation.
Clearly, "a creditor's election of strict foreclosure
prevents obtainment of a deficiency judgment."
Haberer Dairy, 412 N.W.2d at 869. Because
Robert denies that he elected strict foreclosure, and
there clearly was no written notice of election, the
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question then becomes whether Robert, by his
actions, made a de facto election. We find that he
did.
Robert relies heavily on Haberer Dairy, wherein
we held that the creditor (Bank) did not elect strict
foreclosure to the exclusion of all other remedies.
Instead, Bank availed itself of other remedies;
namely, it sued on the debt and attempted to sell the
collateral. Further, Bank notified debtors that it did
not accept the collateral in full satisfaction of the
debt. Id. at 870.
Even though the trial court ruled that Bank was
entitled to possession of the collateral, and Haberers
executed a bill of sale transferring the collateral,
Bank did not take possession until some eight
months later. This delay was permitted by Bank to
allow Haberer time to satisfy the judgment or obtain
refinancing.
An auction sale was conducted
approximately six months after Bank took
possession of the collateral and receipts were
properly applied in satisfaction of Bank's judgment
against the debtor. Id. at 868-69.
We find this case to be factually distinguishable
from Haberer Dairy for the following reasons:
(1) Robert took and maintained exclusive control
and possession of the collateral from time he
purchased the note in July 1980;
•746 (2) Robert continuously held the collateral
on his property and told Victor not to remove it
and to stay away;
(3) It was not until over a year later, in August
1981, that Robert filed suit to collect on the
promissory note; and
(4) Robert did not undertake the sale of the
collateral until December 1984, some four and
one half years after taking possession.
Although Robert did not give written notice of his
intention to exercise strict foreclosure, we deem that
under the facts of this case Robert's actions operated
as a de facto election of strict foreclosure. He is
thereby barred from obtaining a deficiency
judgment.
We reverse the judgment and remand with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of Schramm.
All the Justices concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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